Introduction:

A week ago, a new round of the US /Iran nuclear negotiations started. Even though it was the 7th round since Biden resumed the talks with Iran after Trump withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement, it’s the first round under the leadership of the new Iranian conservative administration. As the US prepares to head East with China as the main title of her battle, east of the Mediterranean countries live through sanctions, war, political upheavals, and crippling economies from Palestine to Afghanistan. The region is sunk in chaos. Lately, tension levels have surged between the opposing axes of the region, and serious war threats between Israel and Iran have been echoed. Today, all eyes are on the outcomes of the Iranian/American negotiations, because whatever its results, it will for sure reshuffle the political cards and affect the current, future, regional, and global geopolitical playground. In this paper, I will try to study all circumstances surrounding the Iranian nuclear agreement in an attempt to understand and predict the likely outcomes of the current negotiations. I’ll be using IPE levels of analysis, structures, and the structuralism perspective as a framework for my analyses-based prediction.

Literature Review:

After Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, negotiations resumed with the newly elected president Joe Biden. As negotiation rounds continue to take place, several commentators had analyses and recommendations on how things will and should proceed. In “Don’t Rush to Failure on Iran Nuclear Negotiations”, James Philips proposed that the current negotiations are likely to end in favor of Iran’s interests: sanctions relief and nuclear restrictions of which Iran will soon turn her back on and breach (3). He proposes that the US should take different measures to make sure that a deal like the old one isn’t secured for Iran. This includes negotiating a new deal with “permanent restrictions” and “stronger provisions” on nuclear enrichment and the ballistic missile project as well (3). All while maintaining sanctions on Iran until it’s made clear that it is fulfilling its commitments (4). Philips concluded that the agreement should be turned into a treaty signed by the U.S. Congress, to prevent future administrations from overruling it(4). To Brian O’Toole, Philips’s stance on Iran/US negotiations is more akin to wishes than realistic steps. In his article: “Rejoining the Iran Nuclear Deal: Not So Easy”, he argues that the “best Biden administration can do is returning into the original JCPOA itself”. He argues that the sanctions might have left their toll on the Iranian Economy, but they have made Iran even more fixated on developing its nuclear and ballistic projects. Iran is still finding means to export oil and has created a web of alternative trade with countries like Venezuela (2). Other members of the JCPOA include Europe, Russia, and China. Europe is frustrated from American policies especially after Trump’s term; Russia and China are both sanctioned by the US as well and have weaved close ties with Iran recently. This means that if the US is to leverage power over Iran during the negotiations, no other party is likely to side with it. Therefore, and contrary to many beliefs, Iran appears to have the upper hand in the negotiations (O’toole 3). O’toole reinforces Philip’s worries about Iran getting out of the deal prosperous and stronger than ever before, citing this as a major challenge for the U.S. (3). He pinpoints the intricate nature of the sanctions the U.S. has posed on Iran (5), claiming that a sanction relief is neither easy nor clear. O’toole concludes that it’s very hard to predict whether the negotiations will succeed or fail. Both countries need to settle many side issues first or agree on some priorities for each (7). Either way it’s not going to be easy.

Analysis:

a)Levels of Analysis:

When thinking about the future outcomes of the current Iran/US nuclear negotiations, it’s reasonable to start with the various factors influencing the course of events. Those factors manifest themselves on four essential levels ranging from policy makers to global determinants.

  1. a) On an individual level, president Joe Biden made it clear since his first election campaigns that returning to the nuclear deal will be a foreign policy priority for his presidency term. He even pledged, in a joint statement issued with the UK, France, and Germany on the margins of G20, that if the US returned to the nuclear deal, it will never leave unless Iran breaks the terms of the deal. The Iranians on the other hand said that it was Trump, the US president, who abandoned the deal and imposed sanctions in the first place. Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme Leader, firmly stated that Iran won’t return to the deal unless all sanctions are lifted, asserting that Iran has no trust whatsoever in the west. Iranian president “Raisi”, echoed Khamenei’s position by in stating Iran’s intentions to return to the agreement on the condition that the sanctions are relieved. Raisi is known to be very close to the supreme leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and is depicted as an anti-west/ anti-American hardliner, which might be an indicator of future stubbornness in bettering relations with the west through the nuclear deal, unlike his predecessor “Rouhani”. It’s worth to mention the role of other leaders, mainly “French Macron” and “Israeli Bennet” in the ongoing negotiations reflecting the conflicting attitudes of their respective countries toward the nuclear deal. In a phone call to “Raisi”, Macron urged Iran to constructively cooperate in the negotiations to lead to a faster return to the agreement. Few days later, PM Bennet phoned US secretary of State Anthony Blinken and asked him for an urgent cessation of the nuclear negotiations with Iran. Nonetheless, the US doesn’t seem responsive to the Israeli pressures.
  2. b) On a state level, the sanctions on Iran are leaving their toll on the country economically, politically, and socially. According to the world bank, in 2020, the size of Iran’s economy has become 83% of its level in 2017 prior to Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, with ill-advised domestic monetary stimulus packages having led to inflationary pressure. (Ghodsi and Nejad 4). This resulted in a surge in prices and unemployment, and left one third of Iranians below the poverty line in 2020, according to the official report by the Iranian ministry of labor. Consequently, Iran is now having to deal with internal instability, as highlighted by the various protests against the regime, especially after the latest issue on the elections concerning the disqualification of Ali Larijani, in which “reformists” are voicing their discontent with the current conservative government and its allegedly staged elections. This situation may push Iran into rejoining the nuclear deal if it gets the sanctions relief it wants. Some speculate that Iran will be cornered by the severity of the economic crisis and rush into a deal that provides even the tiniest relief, the US then can ensure the termination of the Iranian nuclear program. However, apparently Iran is not folding easily, for demonstrated by the increase in Uranium production to 60% (90% is what needed for a bomb), which could be an attempt to rush the Americans into a speedy agreement that plays in Iran’s favour. For the US, Biden is one year away from the partial elections which will determine the future of the democratic majority in the Congress . As the democrats seem to suffer from a decrease in voter’s approval due to covid and economic challenges, a success in getting Iran back to the deal will give the democrats few points in their favor, and portray Biden’s establishment in the way it craves: diplomatic, world leader, and the contrary of everything the Trump administration had been.
  3. c) On an interstate level: In her relation to Iran, Europe’s numerous interests in the area facilitates her role as a supporter of resuming the JCPOA. Europe is mainly interested in the security and economic gains it will get from better relations between the US and Iran. I shall return to these two factors later in this paper, but for now I’m mentioning that to say that Europe’s approach to securing her interest follows a normative paradigm where Europe sees in the JCPOA a chance for a dialogue with Iran where instead of isolating Iran and having her grow more antagonist to the west, it’s better to lure her into joining the global system. The dialogue will as well provide a chance to approach youth in Iran and increase the influence of the western life on them rather than the influence of China and Russia, which will foster more accepting attitude from future Iran toward the west. (Riccardo and Dessi 4). Russia is in favor of an agreement between the US and Iran as well, but for different reason. Though Russia is an ally of Iran to some extent as the two actively fought together in Syria, Russia doesn’t want a rising nuclear power with a significant geopolitical role close to it. Stopping the nuclear project ensures Russia remains the strongest power in the region. Dealing with the rise of China is enough for Russia, and Iran, at least for Russia, is better a strong regional ally under the Russian umbrella or close to it, rather than a competing force. Israel appears to be the main opponent to the negotiations. Israel fears that any agreement would give Iran economic prosperity in exchange for loose constraints on its nuclear power, while her ballistic missile project, and influence in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, even Palestine (through Hamas to an extent) remain unaffected and possibly will increase. Israel sees in Iran and its allies as an existential threat. Gulf countries like KSA and UAE share Israel’s anonymity toward Iran as well. In fact, Israel has made it clear that she’s not abiding to any agreement and will make sure sanctions continue to impoverish Iran. Though Israel’s attitude is not likely to stop the agreement, her actions nonetheless might render the agreement ineffective and threaten security in the middle east.
  4. d) On a global level: Two main global issues can leverage influence over the course of the nuclear negotiations. One is refugees. For Europe, success in the nuclear deal is highly related to its national security. Being, unlike the US, on the edge of the middle east means that any instability there equals waves of refugees on Europe doors. Iran is a major player in the middle east and even central Asia (Europe witnesses immigration waves from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran…). Stability in the middle east, resolving the nuclear threat, and economic prosperity in Iran can all save Europe from another refugee crisis. (Riccardo and Dessi 4) That’s why Europe is really invested in joining Iran and the US in an agreement again. Corona is another influencer. The humanitarian crisis in Iran during Corona reflected just another wicked layer of the harm the sanctions do. The maximum pressure Iran witnessed from the shortage of masks, refusal of countries to send Iran medical supplies, outdated medications transported to Iran, and the issue of the vaccine further complicated the relations between Iran and the west. Following that, Iran became more adamant regarding the lift of sanctions as a precondition for her return to the nuclear deal. However, the US is likely to continue using the sanctions as a weapon of deterrence against Iran. This is perhaps the main hindrance against reaching an agreement.

 

  1. b) IPE Structures

Similarly, IPE perspectives can be useful indicators on whether a new deal between Iran and the US is to be reached.

1) Production: In 2016, Iran GDP growth reached as high as 13.396%. In 2019, it reached as low as (-)6.784. In 2020, it rose again to 1.662% (World Bank). In response to sanctions, Iran Supreme leader called for a “resistance Economy” characterized by self sufficiency, surge in domestic production, minimalism, and reduction in oil dependency. This alternative is still in trial and had few impedances when theory came into practice. Nonetheless, Iran’s resort to innovative approaches to minimize the influence of sanctions is what the Supreme leader affirms to be the way for Iran to transform the threat into an opportunity. This was evident during corona with the domestic production of mask factories and vaccines. The success of such projects devalues the sanction card the US is playing to get Iran to give up concessions, and gives Iran the chance to prolong negotiations until it gets the sanction reliefs it wants.

2) Trade: Iran’s export revenues decreased heavily due to secondary sanctions. Firms had to cut their economic relations with Iran in fear of sanctions. Currency depreciation made imported supplies extremely expensive especially pharmaceuticals, machinery, and medical devices during corona outbreak. The Iranian government found itself unable to cover the expenses and had to decrease its imports to a great extent. This resulted in shortages in merchandise and surge in prices in the Iranian markets causing asymmetric adjustment shock on the trade balance (Ghodsi and Nejad 1). Similarly, oil exports plummeted after Trump’s withdrawal from JCPOA from 4million bpd to 2.6million bpd in 2018. In 2021, oil exports hit a new low reaching 600,000-700,000 bdp. (Ghodsi and Nejad 2). With this in mind, it’s worth talking about Europe and Iran’s trade relationship. “In 2019, the EU’s trade with Iran stood at 16.3 per cent of Iran’s trade, while for the EU, the trade with Iran stands at 0.6 per cent of its total, with 10.8 billion euros in exports to Iran and 10.1 billion euros of imports from Iran in 2017” (European Commission). For Iran, trade to Europe is very lucrative for the country’s economy. Europe, however, view trade secondary to security in its relation with Iran, but sees in the Iranian market a promising investment. In fact, countries like Germany and Italy already have their reputation in the Iranian market, while France has its foot in automobile production in Iran. She even signed a contract to rejuvenate oil and gas industry in Iran directly after the 2015 agreement. However, when Trump imposed sanctions after his withdrawal from the deal in 2018, “European multinational companies like Airbus, Total, Peugeot, Volkswagen, GlaxoSmithKline, Siemens, and Vodafone refrained from making investments in Iran” (Cornelius 5). Thus, while Europe would encourage the return to an agreement, the US is likely to be using the talks over the nuclear deal as a channel to negotiate with Iran on its geopolitical role and exercise extreme pressure to have Iran surrender. Based on what is known about Iran, this is likely to complicate things and lead to the failure of current attempts to restore the nuclear deal.

3) Monetary/Finance: “ By October 28,2020, 1USD equated 318,560 Iranian rial”. The sanctions Trump imposed hit currency rate the most. This led to inflation which was exacerbated by failed domestic policies. Iran’s currency suffered at foreign exchange markets, got many of its monitory assets frozen in foreign banks, and ended up in need of foreign currencies to finance its imports. (Ghodsi and Nejad 3). This falls under the US pressure policy to get Iran to follow what the US wants. Nonetheless, in their article, Batmangehildj and Rouhi argues that Trump sanctions will prove ineffective especially in non-proliferation policies. They state that even after sanctions on Iran were lifted following the 2015 agreement, foreign investment in the country didn’t increase as supposed; some banks even refused to deal with Iran because they were afraid of being charged by financing crimes related to doing business with Iran financial system (84). Sanction relief under Obama administration was chaotic and ineffective. Sanctions in that sense become ineffective as the sanctioned country would never respond to US demands because it assumes that even if it does, not much will change. (193). The aforementioned argument has serious say in the current negotiations as Iran is fixated on lifting the sanctions effectively this time. If the US is not willing to do that, and this is most probable, the negotiations are doomed to fail.

4) Security/Knowledge: In the context of security threats roaming around the nuclear deal, the cyber attacks between Iran and Israel and the unexplained repeated explosions at Natanz Centrifuge Assembly Center, knowledge and security have become a main concern. In fact, the whole process of nuclear fertilization is rooted in world security. For Europe, a deal that ensures Iran won’t have nuclear bomb is essential for its security. If Iran is to have a bomb, this might incentivize other countries in the MENA region like (Turkey, KSA…) to develop their own nuclear projects. This poses threats of instability, terrorism, and again refugees on Europe edge. As for the US and Iran, a war is very unlikely to happen between the two, especially that the US is shifting its focus away from the middle east. The real threat is between Israel and Iran, and the nuclear deal outcome isn’t going to affect that. Israel main concern is the smart missile program. Israel and the US want the issue of Iran missiles and allies to be discussed in relation with the nuclear program; however, Iran has refused. If the US insisted on this topic, the nuclear deal is not likely to be restored. As for a war between Iran and Israel, it might be a matter of when and not if; and is contingent on numerous equally important factors other than the negotiations outcome.

 

  1. c) Perspectives: Structuralism

According to the core periphery model proposed by Wallerstein, the global capitalist economy is divided into core countries, semi-periphery and periphery. To understand the JCPOA, we must understand it as a negotiation between a core and a periphery country. “The elite in a periphery country supply the demand for natural resources for the core countries” (Tagma and lenze 25). Historically, Iran had been a supplier of energy resources for imperialistic nations. The Iranian revolution in 1979 shook the global order and threatened regional monarchies (Tagma and lenze 26). Iran also supports anti-imperialist movements threatening the interests of hegemon countries like the US. In that sense, we can understand the nuclear deal as an attempt of core countries to subdue Iran into the hierarchy of the world order. Through normalizing relations with Iran, core countries will provide a cheap energy supply and a market for consumer goods while dismantling Iran’s nuclear power and missiles. Nevertheless, Iran counts on these weapons as a safeguard from potential Israel and U.S. attacks. (Tagma and lenze 26). Sanctions will remain for various reasons, and the minimal relief will be useless and at the cost of total abandonment of the nuclear project. A good relationship between Iran and the west can happen only when Iran lets go of her revolutionary stance and gets back into the norm of a periphery: open its markets for multinational corporates, end the alternative trade routes it has with the global south, dismantle its welfare state, adopt neoliberal policies, and most importantly doesn’t threaten the interests of imperialism in the region. The nuclear agreement is a channel to bargain Iran on its sovereignty in exchange of lifting sanctions. The agreement is a trap unless Iran uses its wit fully, strengthens her cards in the region, stands up to sanctions through alternatives, and forces the US to remove the sanctions. However, this is not going to be an easy battle.

 

Conclusion:

When it comes to whether the current negotiations regarding the Iran nuclear deal will succeed or fail, opinions vary widely. Some believe it’s doomed to fail as the two parties are unwilling to reach a common ground: Iran needs a complete sanctions’ relief and guarantees so that the US won’t leave the agreement again, while the Americans want to shut down Iran’s nuclear program and negotiate Iran’s geopolitical role in the middle east with no intentions to give crippled Iran a chance to breath. This means that situations will remain at a cliff hanger with high potential of military escalation at any time, mainly between Iran and Israel, which threatens the regional political scene with even more imbalance. On the other hand, other commentators are extremely positive that both Iran and the US are determined to make this deal happens. The US wants to close Iran’s case and concentrate on China as part of resetting priorities. Iranians too would benefit from whatever they’ll get out of the new agreement, especially if trade constraints were to loosen and help revive the deteriorated economy. The social pressure amid Corona and its aftermath could be the catalyst that will make Iran less stringent on its position. This may secure a deal. Some agree with this analysis but predict instead that a limited short-term agreement is the likely formula. As for this paper, and based on IPE levels of analysis, structures, and structuralism perspective, I conclude that Iran and the US likeliness to reach an agreement is contingent upon each country getting what it wants. The U.S. wants a trusted commitment from Iran to restrict its nuclear project and clearly wants a negotiation on Iran geopolitical role. Iran, on the other hand wants a complete relief of sanctions and a treaty that the next administration won’t impulsively reject. While the treaty is possible, a complete sanction relief is not possible nor extremely effective in its current form (investors’ fear, terrorist funding sanctions….). Also, Iran still refuses to discuss any topic other than its nuclear program. As for Iran commitment, the problem is in fact an issue of trust. Iran would be very sensitive to provision teams access areas especially in military sites, and the US would consider Iran provision denial a sign of her breach. Therefore, I don’t see that the current negotiations will succeed. A short-term agreement is possible but it might not be sustained for long.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Works Cited

Alcar, Riccardo, and Andrea Dessi. “A Last Line of Defense:: A Strategy for Europe to Preserve the Iran Nuclear Deal .” Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Dec. 2021, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep19684. Accessed 2019.

Batmanghelidj, Esfandyar, and Mahsa Rouhi. “The Iran Nuclear Deal and Sanctions Relief: Implications for US Policy.” Survival, vol. 63, no. 4, 2021, pp. 183–198., https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1956192.

Cornelius Adebahr, “Europe Cannot Save the Iran Deal But it Must Try,” New Atlanticist, September 4, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/europe-cannot-save-the-iran-deal-but-it-must-try.

E., Tagma Halit M. Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Theoretical Approaches. Lexington Books, 2020.pp.1-33

European Commission, “European Union, Trade in Goods with Iran,” factsheet, April 16, 2018, https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_ iran_en.pdf.

Ghodsi, Mahdi, and Ali Fathollah-Nejad. “The Geopolitical Roots of Iran’s Economic Crisis.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 Nov. 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/83350.

O’toole, Brian. “Rejoining the Iran Nuclear Deal: Not So Easy.” Atlantic Council, Jan. 2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29329. Accessed 16 Dec. 2021.

Phillips, James. “Don’t Rush to Failure on Iran Nuclear Negotiations.” The Heritage Foundation, 11 Jan. 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/IB6036_0.pdf.

World Bank. “GDP growth (annual %)”. World Development Indicators. The World Bank Group,2021, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IR. Accessed Dec.16,2021.

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